Click Here to Return to Index

Return to Milestones Vol. 4, No. 1

This account was presented at the 1977 Beaver County Historical Symposium at Beaver Campus at Penn State University. Dr. Appel is Professor of History at East Stroudsburg State College.

Daniel Brodhead, born in Ulster County, New York, came to Eastern Pennsylvania [now Monroe County] with his parents in 1737 A few years before the Revolutionary War he and his wife moved to Berks County where he had a farm, a grist mill, and served as a deputy surveyor for Pennsylvania. He joined in the early protest movement against British policies in 7774-1775. In 1776 he entered Pennsylvania's military service as a lieutenant colonel. He was transferred to the Continental Army late in 1776 when his unit joined General Washington's forces in defense of New York City. By his courage and initiative, Daniel Brodhead earned promotions of rank and position in 1777. Taking charge of the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment after its commander Aeneas Mackay died, Colonel Daniel Brodhead became well-known in the battles in defense of Philadelphia,and shared the sufferings of Valley Forge with Washington's army in the winter of 1777-1778.

From March, 1779, to September, 1781, Colonel Daniel Brodhead was the commandant of the Western District of the Revolutionary War effort with headquarters at Fort Pitt. No other commandant held that post so long. When Brodhead led the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment from Valley Forge to Fort Pitt in the summer of 1778, it was in preparation for a campaign against the British post at Detroit. Soon after Colonel Brodhead replaced General Lachlan McIntosh as commandant in 1779, the tides of war elsewhere - especially in the South - repeatedly eroded his manpower and supply bases for a Detroit campaign. Brodhead's supply problems, in part, lay in the uncertainty of whether he would fight the British; and, in the necessity of being every ready to deal with the Indians. The very location of the Western district presented unique military supply problems.

This address has three purposes.- (1) to describe how Colonel Daniel Brodhead brought the nation's supply system to bear on the problems of transportation, shelter, clothing, food, and munitions in the Western military district; (2) to discern the unique conditions affecting the military supply problems on the western frontier; (3) to detect the personal qualities of Colonel Brodhead that enabled him to handle the military supply problems of this difficult assignment for two and a half years.

By its great distance from Philadelphia and other Eastern resource centers, Fort Pitt suffered a tenuous existence. Supply requisitions and their deliveries travelled slowly. The winter months virtually cut the Western district off from the rest of the nation. Colonel Brodhead's remoteness from headquarters and from national and state authorities, meant that he was the last to receive orders and regulations. Sometimes these were outdated by the time he received them. This was frustrating to the Commandant. He observed to Washington: "My situation is so remote that I but seldom am acquainted with what passes in the interior of the country.'! When he belatedly received a copy of Regulations respecting the Military Stores Department, Colonel Brodhead regretted that "it is our lot to be thrown at a great distance from Head Qtrs., and the remoteness of our situation prevents receiving necessary information respecting it."

The distance factor increased the expense of frontier defense. The cost of transporting stores across the mountains exceeded the original cost of the goods. The 25-day wagon trip from Philadelphia to Fort Pitt was exposed to hazards of losses due to robberies and untrustworthy transport personnel. Moreover, the roads over the mountains were impassable for weeks on end in the winter because of deep snow. it was impossible for official aid from the East to respond readily to emergency needs on the frontier. Even though there was a widespread shortage of supplies among all Continental forces in the fall of 1780, General Washington pointed to Brodhead's situation as "very alarming", 11 considering the distance you are from supplies and the impending winter." Under these circumstances, Colonel Brodhead learned to make the most of whatever regional resources his frontier had to offer in off-setting the uncertainties of supplies from the East.

The remote location put a special premium upon the practice of economy. When Washington appointed Brodhead to the Fort Pitt post, he advised "the strictest economy in all your conduct and operations .... You may be assured it is become indispensably necessary, and .... you cannot pursue a more effectual means of recommending yourself to public favor and thanks ...... Throughout his tenure, Colonel Brodhead was meticulous in measures of economy out of necessity as well as a matter of policy. After six months on the job, wrestling with manpower and supply problems, he told the Board of War: "I have the vanity to believe that less stores have been wasted in this district during my command than has been known, but time will unfold who has been the greatest economist." Even when supplies seemed to be more than adequate, Brodhead cautioned his subordinates of "a very great necessity for strict economy, and therefore the greatest prudence must be used in issues of every kind." He commanded others to "take every possible care of public property," and to "see that no waste be committed of any stores that are or may come to your garrison."

There was an Indian factor in the Western Department's supply problems such as few other departments so consistently experienced. Denied the opportunity to drive the British from Detroit or Niagara, the armed forces became preoccupied with waging a forest warfare, Indian-style; and attended to the defense of the frontiersmen against Indian forays. This kind of warfare required different equipment, resources, and preparations than a war with the British. Having spent two years in some of the most vicious combat with the British, Colonel Brodhead now found himself analyzing military needs and requisitioning supplies differently for this situation. This included goods with which to win Indian allies and to support them as aides.

There was also a Virginia factor with which Brodhead had to contend. The Virginia-Pennsylvania boundary had not yet been clearly drawn-, and inhabitants of the region would not accede to the recruitment of men and materiel by both sides. Some took one side against the other. At the official level, Colonel Brodhead objected to Virginia recruiters purchasing supplies in Pennsylvania territory-, and Virginians retaliated in kind. Virginia's stake in the West and the priority put on reducing Detroit were such that eventually Continental authorities were persuaded to order Colonel Brodhead to share his Fort Pitt stores with Virginia's expedition led by George Rogers Clark.

Colonel Daniel Brodhead had to administer the Western Department through times that were turbulent for the national and state authorities in devising and operating an efficient and effective supply system. The Continental Congress, by trial and error and experimentation, defined their own functions and those of the Board of War. The Board of War, in conjunction with the armed forces, developed administrative systems of requisition and supply. The financial vehicle which was so essential to the mobilization and distribution of manpower and materiel deteriorated and broke down. The supply system twice underwent a redesign to function with the chaotic and uncertain finances. Throughout 1780 and most of 1781 the initiative and responsibility for supplying the armed forces were shifted from Congress to the states-, and just before Brodhead left Fort Pitt, Congress once again took charge. Within the context of these shifting economic and political forces, Colonel Daniel Brodhead had to manage the military establishment and its activities on the western frontier. Fortunately, he believed in the necessity of a set of national institutions, procedures, and chain-of-command; and, to his credit, he was determined to make the system work, whatever may be its structure.

TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

All of the principal western frontier defense posts were located on navigable rivers. Thus, supplies could be transferred from one to another by boats. Brodhead regarded it as sound economy to employ water facilities instead of horse-and-wagon whenever possible. It was, therefore, essential to maintain the boats in good repair and to construct additional watercraft as needed. This required careful storage or anchorage during the winter months. Colonel Brodhead was embarrassed and apologetic when boat losses occurred because of floods or negligence. He explained to General Washington: "I have frequently given the most pointed orders respecting the public craft, notwithstanding which the greatest part is or will be carried away by the ice. What I could retain at this place (Fort Pitt) I did and secured it by hauling it upon land. If the officers commanding at the different posts had taken the same care little or none would have been driven off." Two months later, Colonel Brodhead wrote again to Washington: ...... greater care could scarcely have been taken than what I took to prevent their (boats) being lost or spoiled; but it was out of my power to watch every person." For economic reasons General Washington declined to authorize a program of boat-building to replace losses and expand the facilities. Brodhead's request for six boatbuilders was denied. Whereupon he put his men to work at amateur watercraft construction and repairs, using limited tools and resources at hand. Within two months, he proudly told the Board of War that twenty poplar canoes had been constructed, some capable of carrying two tons. By August, 1779, nearly sixty such vessels were completed without additional tools and equipment.

The horse-and-wagon was the basic transportation facility. Horses were important also as pack animals and in cavalry service. The army had to be in the horse-and wagon business. The officers had to requisition forage for the health and vigor of the horses-, and had to look after the maintenance and repairs of the wagons. For the special and long-distance cargo transportation, the army leased teams and hired drivers. Their availability was governed by the seasonal activities of teamsters in a region, by the value of money, and by the government's pay rates. For example, packhorse men walked off the job "for want of pay" on occasion-, and the 11 want of money and credit" halted the leasing of teams.

Forage for the horses was almost as vital to the army as food for the soldiers. This was the "fuel" problem of 1779. Teams could not leave Bedford with supplies for Fort Pitt because they could not procure enough forage. Colonel Brodhead complained to the Board of War repeatedly throughout the fall and winter of 1779-1780 about the difficulties of obtaining forage. (Of course, the Board was aware of this distress in other military departments as well.) For Brodhead, it was primarily a financial question. There was forage available in his region. He explained to the Board of War: "We have no forage nor money to purchase it; and if we purchase upon credit we must pay nearly double to cash price." Brodhead found that he could buy forage with salt. This tested his good business sense because salt was also a precious commodity to be used sparingly. As the winter deepened, Colonel Brodhead protested to the Board of War that his horses were in jeopardy: "I fear many of our public horses will perish before the next crop unless a sudden supply (of money) arrives . The farmers in western Pennsylvania simply would not deliver any forage until they saw the money in hand; for the government's credit was suspect.

Sound management of his horsepower required a regular, complete, and accurate accounting of all public horses in Colonel Brodhead's district. In May, 1779 there were 429 "public horses in the different brigades of this district." For transporting supplies over the mountains from the East 864 horses had been used; 224 of those were public horses. Horses assigned to one post were not to be transferred to another without the commandant's approval; and their care was of prime concern. Certainly horses were to be employed only for public services and not for private hunting or travel pleasures. Brodhead bristled at reports of such misuse of horses. He told Captain James Carnaghan: "I am informed that some of your party have had presumption enough to take packhorses which are under their care to recover flesh and to ride them a hunting; this practice is scandalous if true and you have my positive orders to prevent it in future. If an officer has taken such liberty you are to arrest him, if a non-comm'd officer or soldier you will confine him or them, in order that an example may be made of the offender or offenders."

The acquisition of horses raised questions of need, cost, and quality. Colonel Brodhead was costconscious. He tried to get along with the minimum number of horses. He bought or transferred horses according to the needs of the several posts under his command. In a report to the Board of War in the spring of 1780 Brodhead judged his horsepower to be adequate for his department's purposes. There were no immediate plans for a military offensive requiring extra horses. When it was necessary to lease teams and hire drivers, there were serious problems. The scarcity of wagons for the westward trip delayed the delivery of artillery and other military stores to Fort Pitt for weeks.

Colonel Brodhead professed to know quality horses when he saw them. For that reason, he objected to the transfer of some horses from General John Sullivan's stock after the Sullivan expedition into Indian country. Brodhead condemned them as "worn out or of little service before they came to this District. He went on to say: "If I feed them through the winter they will eat more than they are worth, for they are old and poor." There is no record of their sale; but a month later he was ordering "a team of good hardy horses." On another occasion, Brodhead told his quartermaster " one of my horses is almost blind, and if you can make a reasonable purchase of a horse that will suit me, I shall be much obliged to you."

Going into the fall of 1779 when horse transport needs were diminishing it was time to "put out into good range of two hundred of the oldest and most worn down to recover their flesh. Brodhead observed that "the waste farms in this neighborhood offered a great quantity of good pasture and the woods excellent pea-vine." These horses would "soon be fit for service or sale as shall appear to be most conducive to the public interest."

SHELTER PROBLEMS

Housing facilities, important to the health and safety of the soldiers, took two forms on the western frontier. Wooden barracks accommodated the minimum permanent garrisons. Tents sheltered the larger number of soldiers who were on short-term service or were tentatively assembling for the start of a campaign against the enemy. The wooden barracks could be constructed from local resources-, whereas, the tents had to be imported from Eastern textile sources.

The long distance for transporting tents and the uncertainty of delivery compelled Colonel Brodhead to anticipate his shelter needs months in advance. Even then, his men were always inadequately sheltered. During the fall and winter of 1779-1780 Brodhead repeatedly complained about the failure of his tent order to arrive. In October he was saying: "not a single tent has arrived for the troops in this District, and I am at a loss to determine where the fault lies." In February it was no better: "not a single tent to cover my men (except some worn out tents) .... two hundred new tents will be necessary and they ought to be of the best quality." In March, no tents having yet been delivered, Brodhead was submitting a supplemental requisition of three hundred additional tents to accommodate the local militia in the forthcoming field operations. He cautioned that these tents should not be of linen because the militiamen could cut them up for hunting shirts.

General Washington vetoed Brodhead's tent requisition for two reasons: one, there were to be no frontier campaigns for which the militia would be called out; two, the tent supply was very low. As a gesture of good intentions, Washington suggested to the Board of War that "it may however be well perhaps to send Colonel Brodhead a few horsemen's tents, a very small number fit for soldiers as they may be useful in case of sickness and on some other occasions." Brodhead politely acquiesced in that decision, fully cognizant of the general tent shortage. He hoped for "a few to cover our arms." Nevertheless, he reminded the Board of War that the existing tents were "quite unfit for service," being two years old.

The auxiliary posts were generally regarded as tentative, ruling out the likelihood of much permanent construction. For example, when Captain Thomas Campbell requested an expansion of the barracks at Fort Crawford, Colonel Brodhead demurred because he did not consider this a permanent installation. Before winter descended, he ordered Fort Crawford abandoned. For Fort Armstrong, Colonel Brodhead authorized the construction of "centry boxes" to "shelter the poor soldiers from the weather." He instructed the commander of Fort McIntosh on how to tighten the leaky roofs and the defective chimney of the barracks. A year later he reported the Fort Pitt barracks were "in very bad order;" but he had neither money nor carpenter's tools for making the repairs.

CLOTHING PROBLEMS

In the attention Colonel Brodhead gave to the clothing of his soldiers, he demonstrated a human, personal concern. At the beginning of his administration, he quickly compared the available clothing stock with the anticipated manpower expansion of the garrison. He submitted his estimates to the Board of War and to General Washington. Washington hastened to advise the Board on how to satisfy Brodhead's requests. This was most encouraging to Brodhead; and two weeks later when he was notified that a quantity of clothing was on its way, he happily commented: "I shall now have the pleasure to see the troops well furnished."

The seasonal changes in Western Pennsylvania created new sets of clothing needs. After assessing winter clothing requirements early in the fall, Colonel Brodhead applied to Pennsylvania's President Joseph Reed for help with "blankets, shirts, hats, shoes & stocking & leggings or woolen overalls." Conditions were so distressing that he felt like submitting his resignation to General Washington.

The clothier-general was in charge of supplying the soldiers with clothing-, and General Washington notified the new clothier-general, James Wilkinson, to "lose no time" in delivering to Fort Pitt a list which he submitted. Washington already had his doubts about Wilkinson's sense of duty-, and experience was to substantiate those misgivings. Meanwhile, Colonel Brodhead was reiterating to the Board of War the garrison's need for clothing. He added that "troops which (are) constantly employed in ranging thru the woods require a larger supply of some articles than such as are employed in an open country." At this time the Pennsylvania government responded with a limited supply of "Regimental clothing" for which Brodhead readily sent an aide - Captain John Finley - to claim and transport to Fort Pitt. In distributing this supply Brodhead ruled out all soldiers whose terms were soon to expire.

When the allotment arrived, it was deficient in shoes and hats which Brodhead had ordered. It was useless to submit a supplementary requisition; for the distance was far and the winter was near. To obtain footwear, Colonel Brodhead instructed a Lieutenant, Major Richard Taylor, to set about making moccasins out of deerskins. He found some wool hats in the local stores but could not procure them "because we have neither money nor is anyone here authorized to purchase." He was tempted to buy on credit without authorization.

Looking ahead to the following summer, Colonel Brodhead wisely submitted his summer requisition in February. For each soldier he asked "one shirt, one hunting shirt, and two pairs of linen overalls." A month later he dispatched Captain Thomas McIntire to claim the supply and to request additional shoes for the anticipated Detroit campaign. (For himself, Brodhead asked for scarlet cloth for a suit and linen for shirts). A month later he sent another aide to obtain a special allotment of officers' clothing provided by Congress. Moreover, apparently the summer clothing order had not been fully met; for Brodhead begged Wilkinson to "exert yourself to get some summer clothing suitable for them" even if the entire requisition could not be filled. In mid-summer, some of the men were still wearing their winter clothes because of a shortage of summer shirts and overalls. By that time, Brodhead had his order ready for the next winter's clothing.

In the summer of 1781 Brodhead reported that the clothing situation was worse than the year before. General Washington was greatly troubled-, and sadly stated that "the Continental magazine is exhausted." The state of Pennsylvania would have to bear the burden. Turning to Pennsylvania's President Joseph Reed, Brodhead enumerated the entire range of his requisitions for which he was hopefully waiting "blankets, hats, coats, jackets, woolen overalls, sock shoes .... for all the troops here." A Maryland corps attached to his command had gone back to Maryland to seek clothing; and he feared that other units would depart "unless care is taken to have them properly clothed and fed. " Brodhead requested Reed to communicate these circumstances to Congress."

In addition to the Fort Pitt garrison, Colonel Brodhead was responsible for clothing the men at the subordinate posts such as Forts Crawford and Armstrong. The friendly Indians also came under his solicitous care. That was one way of maintaining their loyalty as well as expressing his sense of compassion. Upon finding the Delaware chiefs "quite destitute of clothing," Brodhead applied to the Board of War for help to prevent their disaffection to the British. He later recommended that the Board might send him a quantity of damaged cloth, stored at Winchester, Virginia, "to clothe some of the naked Indians." He asked also for 11 some trimmings such as buttons and thread."

FOOD PROBLEMS

The food supply problems at Fort Pitt were a compound of seasonal conditions, transportation obstacles, money troubles, and the priorities of shifting war theatres. In warm weather the meat had to be salted rather than fresh; in the late fall and winter when fresh meat would not spoil there were procurement and transportation problems. Colonel Daniel Brodhead had difficulties, also, with his flour and salt supplies - both of which were regarded as basic to the feeding of his garrison. Droughts in the summer season cut the grain yield; and the dwindling streams left the flour mills idle. Inasmuch as Pennsylvania was a major supplier of flour for the American market, increased military activity elsewhere drew flour away from this region. Although Brodhead, at first, blamed his predecessor for leaving him an inadequate stock of meat, he soon learned from experience that many of his problems lay in other areas.

First, General Washington designated Fort Pitt as a depository to which the Continental Congress, through the Board of War, would deliver supplies required in that area. The commandant was responsible for sharing his stores with his auxiliary posts. At worst, he closed out garrison posts in order to consolidate his men near the supplies. For example, in October, 1780, he moved the men of Forts Henry and Holyclays Cove to FortsMcIntosh and Pitt. To allay local fears of insecurity, he called on the militia to occupy the vacated forts temporarily. They could more easily draw on local food resources. On at least one occasion, when Fort Pitt's meat supply was depleted, Brodhead "robbed Fort McIntosh of some stinking beef" for his own men.

Secondly, the deterioration of the nation's finances shifted the supply responsibilities to the states. The Continental Congress assigned to each state a quota of specific provisions; and the commander-in-chief designated the storehouses and the quantities to be delivered. The first assignment to Fort Pitt under this system was 2,400 barrels of flour and 7,000 gallons of rum. Throughout the first year of the state supply, conditions did not improve at Fort Pitt. Repeatedly Colonel Brodhead described his situation in crisis language: "great want"; "scarce indeed"; "quite empty"; "much difficulty"; "great distress"; "great suferers",- Colonel Brodhead related to General Washington a pathetic story of being confronted by his distraught garrison: "The whole garrison, with Serjeants to lead them, came to my quarters a few days ago to represent that they had not rec'd any bread for five days together. Their conduct was civil and respectful, and upon being told that every possible exertion was making to prevent their further suffering they retired in good order to their quarters."

Colonel Brodhead did not hesitate to denounce those officials who were negligent or incompetent. When the post of Deputy Commissary was left unfilled for a time, Brodhead wrote to Colonel Ephraim Blaine, the Commissary-General: "I hope you are making provision for us. If you are not, it is high time I should know it, for no person can be stupid enough to suppose these men more than others can subsist upon the wind, and therefor must expect them to march to places where provisions can be furnished." When new personnel arrived soon thereafter, Brodhead became hopeful of better service.

George Washington, the commander-in-chief, was most sympathetic and helpful with Colonel Brodhead's provision problems. He dashed urgent letters off to the Continental Congress and the Pennsylvania authorities. He notified the Pennsylvania administration to deposit at Fort Pitt 2,400 barrels of flour, 1000 barrels of salt meat (or its equivalent in salt for fresh meat), and 7000 gallons of spirits. General Washington shared Colonel Brodhead's dissatisfaction with the state quota system of furnishing provisions. Nevertheless, since the "Continental Magazine is exhausted" he said Pennsylvania would have to support the 8th Regiment.

The Pennsylvania Executive Board acknowledged its responsibility for these supplies- but sadly confessed that "we are utterly unprovicled with the means of making new purchases." The Pennsylvania Assembly would have to face the financial crisis. Throughout the winter of 1780-81 the Fort Pitt troops were on half meat rations. There were periods of successive meatless days. Local supplies were of little relief. Even in the summer of 1781 Fort Pitt's food shortage was so serious as to produce a near revolt. The non-commissioned officers and men presented Colonel Brodhead with a petition to be transmitted to the Pennsylvania Executive Council. Brodhead added sympathetically that these men had "suffered great hardships" and their wants should be "speedily supplied by those who may have it in their power." He told Joseph Reed that he had vainly resorted to every conceivable solution.

Colonel Brodhead aimed to rely as much as possible on food production in the western region. This meant encouraging the frontiersmen to tend their farms. To that end, he scheduled militia duty so as not to interfere with crop planting and harvesting. In the spring of 1780, Brodhead was optimistic that this production strategy would yield "sufficient supplies of bread and meat .... drawn from the inhabitants on this side of the mountains to subsist all the troops that may be employed upon the frontier.." He also saw this as a measure of economy, saving the heavy transportation expenses.

IBrodhead was to be disappointed with the capacity and willingness of the western region to provide food for the soldiers. The militia could not (or would not) furnish enough provisions for their own two-week call-up duty. Not even the promise of reimbursing the militiamen for their own provisions got adequate results. Brodhead then appealed to the practical service of selfdefense "to the settlements on this side of the hills." He expected there would be a ready response from 11 every man who has the cause of his country and humanity at hearts." With these appeals he was certain the communities would try to raise the supplies. The Pennsylvania Executive Council instructed its commissary agents to purchase in Westmoreland County for delivery to Fort Pitt. In fact, they set a quota for the county: 50 barrels of flour, 500 bushels of corn, and 100 gallons of whiskey per month. The State provided Colonel Brodhead with official instructions and receipt forms to strengthen his hand in purchasing food. The Board of War, with misgivings about the state's purchasing power, admonished Colonel Brodhead that he may have to resort to impressment (i.e. forced sales).

General Washington supported forced sales by saying that "necessity must .... justify the measure of taking by impress what the inhabitants can spare." Likewise, Brodhead, carrying the responsibility for the lives of his troops, reasoned: "We can have no objection to the using necessary compulsion rather than the troops should suffer."

Colonel Brodhead dispatched Captains Uriah Springer and Samuel Brady on foraging expeditions to impress provisions. An assistant purchasing commissary went along to explain the instructions to the inhabitants and attempt to cultivate their good will. Brodhead hoped "the virtuous inhabitants will judge rightly of the (impressment) measure and cheerfully submit to a temporary compulsion for to gain an everlasting Right to dispose of their property not only by their own consent in the Legislature, but by inclination as individuals." He wanted the sellers to know that "they will be generously and speedily paid the full value of such Provisions as may be taken for supplying the Troops.

The drastic impressment of food and forage only alienated the frontiersmen further. Not only did they drive their cattle out of reach into mountain fastnesses,but "they now threaten to rise in arms" against the foraging parties. Colonel Brodhead concluded that it was "next to an impossiblity to procure any considerable quantity of Beef or Pork on this side of the mountains" for the winter stores. Before winter descended on the region, Brodhead called in his foraging parties. Instead, he sent out another group of men to hunt wild game. They were to go as far as the Little Kanawha River.

Fortunately, the East was able to deliver relief supplies of meat and grain. Brodhead gladly volunteered to send men to drive the cattle. No matter where the states found the supplies, it was obvious that the state quota system was an abject failure.

MUNITIONS PROBLEMS

On the western frontier the military commandant requisitioned munitions by types of amounts that would serve three distinct purposes: (1) the defense of fortified positions,- (2) the irregular forest fighting practised by the Indians-, (3) the projected campaign against such distant British posts as Detroit and Niagara. Regardless of the type of munitions, the very remoteness of this region imposed the utmost economy. Arms had to be brought long distances from the East; for there were no local sources.

Colonel Brodhead was sensitive to various measures of economy. He listened to General Washington's advice that, so far as possible, frontiersmen should be recruited for service in the Western District. They were less apt to waste ammunition. Brodhead observed that there were even temptations to the frontiersmen to waste. He cautioned the commander at one Fort (Armstrong) "not (to) suffer any firing except at an enemy or by a hunter employed (if you have any in your company)."

Economy could be effected through adequate arms maintenance. Armourers were employed to perform this service. They required special tools and commanded high wages. A scarcity of funds deprived Fort Pitt of these very essential services. Brodhead's appeal to the Board of War for "two or three good armourers ... to have our arms in the best firing order" went unsatisfied.

Artillery requisitions were more frustrating for Colonel Brodhead. These weapons were at a premium in every theatre of the Revolutionary War; and they were the more expensive. Nevertheless, Brodhead needed artillery, too: (1) to defend the established forts-, (2) to demolish Detroit. Since the Detroit project was always in mind - and yet in abeyance - Colonel Brodhead repeatedly estimated and requsitioned artillery pieces. Their delivery suffered unaccountable delays - probably out of respect to more urgent military action elsewhere. Nevertheless, General Washington and General Henry Knox managed to draw up a reasonable list of ordnance and related stores. Within five weeks the order was on its way with artillery officers and a few armourers to manage the weaponry.

Colonel Brodhead's ultimate disappointment was to share his munitions with Major George Rogers Clark's Detroit expedition. It began when Virginia's Governor Thomas Jefferson applied to General Washington for a share of the Fort Pitt stock. Upon studying the Fort Pitt inventory, Washington conceded that Colonel Brodhead should be able to contribute specified weapons and tools. Washington, therefore, notified Brodhead to deliver to Clark "all, or as many of the foregoing articles (listed) as you have it in your power to furnish." Out of respect to Brodhead's position, General Washington asked the Board of War to replace the donated artillery and other equipment "as expeditiously as possible."

INDIAN SUPPLY PROBLEMS

So important was the Indian factor in the western frontier military operations that Colonel Brodhead regarded it as "next to an impossibility to carry on a secret expedition against that place (Detroit) whilst the English have goods to engage the Indians in their interest, and we have nothing but words." With "a few goods and some trinkets" Brodhead believed he could 11 engage them to go against the Enemy." Indians were skillful and effective in espionage against hostile Indians as well as against the British. Brodhead declared that these services were worth whatever they cost.

General Washington endorsed the value of Indian services on the frontier; and gladly authorized Colonel Brodhead to apply to the Board of War for "some supplies and trinkets for the Indians." The Board of War was unprepared to fulfill Brodhead's requests because the other commanders rarely applied for Indian goods in the other theatres of war. Nevertheless, Quartermaster-General Timothy Pickering promised to fill a moderate requisition. Brodhead submitted "a moderate one" estimated at 500 pounds (1774 prices). He reassured Pickering that this would be a good investment; for "it will be the means of saving a great public expense by averting for a time the Indian war from our clefenceless frontiers." Earlier, Brodhead had recommended furnishing Indians with supplies in exchange for peltry, thus yielding a profit for the Board of War.

CONCLUSION

No matter how you look at the military supply on the western frontier, each of its components presented a unique challenge to the military commandant. Transportation facilities, shelter, clothing, food, and munitions were affected by the distinctive traits of that region: its remoteness from the rest of the war effort-, the presence of an Indian factor; the distant and limited contact with the British; a scattered body of settlers with limited capability of assisting in their own defense; the irritating juncture of Virginia and Pennsylvania. All of these factors influenced the nature, amounts, and availability of military supplies. In this multi-faceted situation Colonel Daniel Brodhead operated with understanding, patience, courage, and resourcefulness. He managed to draw on the resources of the frontier region, manipulate his military stores and personnel, and get the maximum results from the supply system of the new nation.

Colonel Brodhead depended, in large measure, on the newly devised national supply system. He had to work within it during the years when it was most sorely strained by the exertions of war and the trials of financial distress. By necessity he had to understand the chain of command, its channels of communication, and its sources of supply. Out of his personal conviction about military discipline, he wanted to make the system work. He held the Commander-in-Chief - General Washington - in highest regard. He approached the Continental Congress, the Board of War, and the Pennsylvania State authorities with respect, regardless of the personalities involved. However, out of his keen sense of responsibility for the welfare of his military units, he was candid and direct in his supply requests; and he did not hesitate to reiterate his supply needs until he obtained the most satisfactory response possible.

Colonel Brodhead was sufficiently flexible and pragmatic to adapt himself to changed circumstances and personnel. Nevertheless, he never lost sight of his military assignments nor the authority of his military rank. The first was a guideline in requisitioning; by the second he exacted the maximum benefits from his provisions. He could not have held this difficult command for two and one half years had he not managed his military supply well.

Colonel Brodhead was relieved of his command in September, 1781, in the face of charges by subordinates, bearing in part on questions about the acquisition and management of supplies. In particular, there were charges "for misapplying and not appropriating public money to the purposes intended" and "for not attending to the comfort and accommodation" of the soldiers. In a court-martial held in Philadelphia he was acquitted of all charges except one. Brodhead had applied part of the recruiting money "for the purpose of supplying the garrison with provisions, in which the court think him justifiable" and therefore acquitted him of that charge, too. soon thereafter, General Washington recommended his promotion to the rank of General Brodhead.